07 October, 2015

The Volatile Security of Volatile Memory

I forgot about yesterday...
It is the black box in every system, even our brain.  Volatile memory goes by many names, working memory, temporary memory, RAM, even just memory.  Whatever your preference, when you mention it you're most likely referring to the area of a system in which data is stored for a relatively short period of time until it is used and then discarded (or transferred to persistent storage).  One cannot possibly imagine a system without some form of memory; even if it is the same are where it is stored permanently, there is still some area used for temporary calculations.

Among the major differences between RAM and persistent storage is that RAM typically contains data about the processes that are currently in execution along with the data we are working on right now and will be discarded soon (yes I hear your screams, persistent storage does that too, but it also has data that we haven't looked at for months).  Along with this fact, hard disks enjoy the possibility of being totally encrypted.  They cannot be read unless the key is provided.  This is not possible in RAM, primarily because the CPU cannot work with encrypted commands.

I do not mean that the CPU is not able to process encrypted data and convert it to plain text, what I am referring to is the inability of the CPU to understand encrypted commands (opcodes) or work on the encrypted data as data rather than a decryption payload.  Let's say we have the binary value of 13 = 1101 and we want to add that to 5=101.  Our simple XOR encrypter will give us the values 0111 and 000 for the keys 1010 and 101 respectively.  Adding 0111 and 000 does not give the actual result for 18=10010.  The values have to be in plain text before actual processing.  XOR is simple and integral to CPUs so it is the simplest operation for it to decrypt the values.  Once decrypted it is then possible to add the values.

But here is the problem - where is the key stored?  Of course, working memory.  What is the point of encrypting the data in RAM when the key is in the same RAM?  What is the point of encrypting RAM after all?


We encrypt disks because they can be removed or because they are portable, yet still contain data, unlike RAM which hold it until we turn off the system (or a bit longer if you're into memory freezing and forensics).  So, we think, RAM is inaccessible to would-be hackers.  Or so we used to think.

Recent research by various people and organisations (Sophos, Brian Krebs, Volatility Labs, among others) have identified a simple and small malware that simply looks up processes, maps their memory regions, copy paste and onto the attackers server for them to enjoy.  And by the way, the kind of data was not you're ex's text messages, but the PIN to you credit card, so it's a bit more expensive I would say.

Use only for great dinners.

I did my own research (and eventually BSc. thesis) on this subject, and it is quite scary knowing that the very heart of your system may be so easily compromised.  What's worse is that when you enter your PIN into any other system on which you have no control...God knows what's running on them and where your data goes.  Anti viruses barely have an idea how to capture such an attack, and neither do firewalls, internet protection or whatever you have.  If they did, they would block your debugger too, because that's how it works - like a debugger.  It's like a kitchen knife used for a murder - you cannot ban knives.

Here's a short and sweet step-by-step on how you can scrape your memory.  It's not intended to attack anyone, and it wouldn't be easy any way.  It's successful only if your target cannot protect their networks and you manage to get in.  The sample was done on Linux;  Windows would be totally different but still very possible (the Target attacks were in fact on Windows).  So here it goes:

A dummy little program was written in C.  All it did was store a username and password (entered using getpass() for increased security) along with a series of credit card numbers that are "swiped" into the system.

Swiping cards
We then find the PID of this running process just by ps aux | grep scrape (the program is named scrape, but it may be something like POSSwiper for example)

get pid.png
Getting the PID

Now we can get all the memory regions and maps used by our processes.  The /proc directory gives us a hand there.

dump maps.png
/proccing to analyse the memory

We are interested in the heap space of our program which shows up nicely in the fourth line;  ranging from address 009580000 to 00979000 (both hex).  Next thing we do is fire up the actual scraper (which is, in our case, a kitchen knife.  A legitimate gdb debugger).

gdb dump.png
Dumping memory in just one line!

GDB shows a bunch of text; we're only interested in how we started it (gdb -pid <PID>) and how we stole the memory (dump memory <to where> 0x958000 0x979000)  As you can see, using the exact heap space memory range we got from /proc.  The memory will be dumped to the file we choose.  Of course, this requires administrator rights, but as one might expect, tens and hundreds of POS devices will most likely share the same password, and will probably have the default one too (such a typical case of a security breach - I found the password to my ISP's router on a public forum...).

Now, onto the next step - the analysis, if you call it that.  Data dumped into the file is from RAM, so as expected it is binary.  Linux simplifies this analysis by providing another tools - strings.  All it does is see what's in a file and spit our all the strings it could find.  That's it, so we pass the dump to it and we get a nice list of string, including the password (you didn't see it in the first screenshot because of getpass()) and all the numbers and everything.

acquire strings.png
The gold mine

That is all.  Now go and whitelist the list of processes on your system, before someone gets to scrape the memory off it.

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